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The subject of this article is corporate governance-a key issue of the discus-
sion concerning corporate law in the United States and in Europe. Indeed, the
topic appears to be as old as the corporation itself. The following remarks focus
on a singular, but nevertheless multifaceted, aspect of corporate responsibility:
the liability of directors of a company.
Directors' liability has gradually been extended during recent years. The main
reasons for this dev'elopment are: the introduction of special legislation, the
German Stock Corpuration Act, prescribing objective liability, and a stricter
assessment by the courts of what constitutes improper conduct. It must be ac-
knowledged from an American viewpoint, however, that because there are no
class actions in Germany, only a few cases concerning directors' liability are ever
taken to court, as compared with frequent such litigation in the United States.
The growing attention of the public should also be noted. Market failures,
corporate scandals, and cases of improper activities of directors have been dis-
closed. In particular, various data have been gathered in Germany about the
relevance of multiple directorates, the influence of banks as members on super-
visory boards, and the economic concentration of corporations. Remarkable
examples are dealt with in public discussion. One such example is the takeover
of the electronic and electrical parts producing company AEG by the car man-
ufacturer Daimler-Benz. The influence of German banks is clearly illustrated by
the proposed acquisition of the Flick conglomerate by the Deutsche Bank. 1 Past
concerns about directors' conflicts of interest have now become even more acute.
Another facet that needs to be mentioned at the outset is the established and
far-reaching system of labor codetermination on the supervisory board in Ger-
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Germany.
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I. See, e.g., Frankfurter Allgemeine, Dec. 3, 1985, No. 280, at 13, concerning the takeover
of AEG by Daimler Benz; see also id., Dec. 7, 1985, No. 284, at 14, concerning the proposed
acquisition of the Flick-conglomerate by the Deutsche Bank.
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many. Workers' representatives serve alongside shareholders' representatives as
directors on boards of various large enterprises. This arrangement helps to ap-
pease traditional ideological conflicts between capital and labor.
Furthermore, the refinements concerning the requirements of the directors'
duties of care and loyalty are a constant challenge for judges and legal scholars.
The discussion in this article concentrates on directors' standards of care, con-
flicts of interest, and fiduciary duties. The analysis attempts to define a basis of
directors' duties and the prerequisites of their liability.
I. Background
A. MEANING OF THE TERM "DIRECTOR" IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE Two
PROTOTYPES OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS AND THE Two-TIER SYSTEM
The American use of the term "director" refers to a group of persons gov-
erning a private law corporation. Thus, director has a specific legal meaning
within the corporate structure. In German legal language, the word director
rarely appears and does not have the same distinct meaning. It is used often as
a title for an individual having executive functions. To obtain a German equiv-
alent, one must consider the structure of German corporations; in order to de-
termine directors' potential liability under German law, their position within the
organization of these corporations must be defined. 2
There are two types of business corporations of overriding significance under
German law: (1) the Aktiengesellschaft (AG), a public stock corporation or joint
2. The structure of German corporations has been carefully analyzed in a number of articles.
Only the leading ones are cited: A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE (1976) [hereinafter A.
CONARD, CORPORATIONS]; M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1976); Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in
European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459 (1984) [hereinafter Conard,
Supervision]; Eckert, Shareholder and Management: A Comparative View on Some Corporate Prob-
lems in the United States and Germany, 46 IOWA L. REV. 12 (1960); Grossfeld, Management and
Control of Marketable Share Companies, in 13 lr'L ENC. COMP. L. ch. 4 (1973) [hereinafter
Grossfeld, Management]; Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Comparative
View of Corporate Power in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 397 (1978)
[hereinafter Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power]; Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Gov-
ernance: European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1338 (1984); Roth, Supervision of Corporate Management: The "Outside" Director and the German
Experience, 51 N.C.L. REV. 1369 (1973); Schoenbaum & Lieser, Reform of the Structure of the
American Corporation: The "Two-Tier" Board Model, 62 Ky. L.J. 91 (1973); Vagts, Reforming the
"Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966); most recently,
see Behrens, The Acquisition of Control over a Corporation Report on German Law, GERMAN NAT'L
REP. (PRIVATE L. & CIV. PRoc.) (1987); Raiser, The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (1988); Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism: New
Industrial Policy and the "Essence" of the Legal Person, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 130 (1988). Only some
fundamental German legal literature is listed: A. BAUMBACH, A. HUECK & G. HUECK, AKTIENGESETZ
§ 76 note 7 (13th ed. 1968) [hereinafter A. BAUMBACH]; MEYER & LANDRUT, AKTIENGESETZ,
Schilling, § 16 note 1 (1973) [hereinafter Schilling]; K. SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (COMPANY
LAW) (3d ed. 1986); see further Grossfeld & Ebke, Probleme der Unternehmensverfassung in
rechtshistorischer und rechtsvergleichender Sicht, 22 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAF [AG] 57-65, 92-
102 (1977) [hereinafter Grossfeld & Ebke, Problems].
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stock corporation; the governing body of law is the Stock Corporation Act of
1965 Aktiengesetz (AktG);3 and (2) the Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung
(GmbH), a company with limited liability, or close corporation; the governing
body of law is the Close Corporation Act of 1892 (GmbHG), as amended by the
revised version of 1980, which became effective in 1981.
In accord with the AktG, the AG functions by means of a dual system of
corporate government, a so-called two-tier system, under which corporate pow-
ers are shared by two entirely separate bodies: the Vorstand, or board of man-
agers or executive directors, and the Aufsichtsrat, or supervisory board.4 The
shareholders' meeting (GeselIschafterversammilung) is the third independent
body of the AG in which the shareholders exercise their rights concerning the
corporation. During recent years, several countries have contemplated the su-
pervisory board, which is separate and distinct from day-to-day management
(i.e. the executive managers). The AktG rests upon the two-tier-system. The
supervisory board is composed of persons who have their main duties elsewhere
and are, therefore, only able to make a contribution to the operation of the
company on a limited scale. It is for that reason that the supervisory board
directors are sometimes referred to as "part-time directors." With regard to
directors' liability, this factual restriction of time contributed must always be
taken into account.
All functions and tasks of the executive management are allocated to the
management board by section 76. Generally speaking, one may say that the
management board fulfills the functions of the "in-house directors" or officers of
a U.S. stock corporation, whereas the members of the supervisory board, who
are elected by the shareholders' meeting, can somehow be compared with "out-
side directors" of a U.S. stock corporation. The supervisory board (the term is
self-explanatory) supervises and controls the management board (section 111).
According to the recent report of the German Corporate Law Commission, the
two-tier system will be preserved. The Commission had considered a new model
based on American corporate structure, but later rejected it. 5
In a GmbH the functions of management are carried out by the Geschiiftsfii-
hrung or business management. Its legally required mandatory bodies are the
3. Aktiengesetz [AktG], 6 September 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI.1] 1089; see
Behrens, supra note 2, at 10-12.
4. See H.J. MERTENS, Annotations, in KOLNER KOMMENTAR § 76 note 1, (1970); MEYER
LANDRUT, supra note 2, § 73 note 2; M. LUTrER, INFORMATION UND VERTRAULICHKEIT IM AUFSICH-
TSRAT 2 (2d ed. 1984); ECKHARDT, E. GESSLER, W. HEFERMEHL, & KROPFF, AKTIENGESETZ vor § 76
note 9 (1973) [hereinafter ECKHARDT]; Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power, supra note
2, at 399; Schwark, Zum Haftungsmassstab der Aufsichtsratmitglieder einer Aktiengesellschaft, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR WINFRIED WERNER 841, 852 (W. Hadding ed. 1984) (publication in honour of
Winfried Werner); Vagts, supra note 2, at 50; Conard, Supervision, supra note 2, at 1461, 1465.
5. Claussen, Fussnoten zum Bericht der Unternehmensrechtskommission, 28 AG 1, 7 (1983).
A lot of large American corporations have "adopted working structures strikingly similar to the
two-tier system," M. EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 180; for further reference, see Grossfeld & Ebke,
Controlling Corporate Power, supra note 2, at 406.
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shareholders' meeting Gesellschafterversammlung, in the sense of the supreme
governing body of the corporation, and the business managers Geschaftsfiihrer.
The GmbH does not ordinarily have a mandatory supervisory board. However,
its bylaws frequently provide for a corporate body in addition to the Geschafts-
fihrung, which is entrusted with tasks similar, if not identical, to those of a
supervisory board.6 Terms and functions of supervisory boards in the GmbH are
defined in section 52 of the GmbHG, which refers to various provisions of the
AktG.
The American corporate law's "board of directors" performs functions car-
ried out by two different bodies in the German corporation. Under German law
the question of liability of directors, therefore, should concern itself with both
the members of the executive management and with the members of the super-
visory board. Under the two-tier system, the liability of executive managers and
board members is treated as one common problem. The bipartition of a com-
pany's management is particularly distinct and of consequence in German law.
Nevertheless, according to sections 116 and 93, the provision of the AktG on
liability of directors of the supervisory board simply refers to the provisions of
the business management.
B. Focus ON THE DIRECTORS OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD
In order to limit discussion, this article deals only with the directors of the
supervisory board. Accordingly, there is no emphasis on the business managers.
The scope of the discussion is limited to the liability of the directors of the
supervisory board, both for the AG and the GmbH. The terms "directors" or
"board members" are used to mean directors of a supervisory board. This
distinction may not be easily compared to the American board system. Never-
theless, as this article shows, the difference in liability of the executive managers
on the one hand and the directors of the supervisory board on the other results
from the nature of their respective duties, rather than from a different concept of
liability. The principles of the former are to a large extent applicable to the latter.
That is why section 116, concerning directors' liability, simply refers to section
93, which sets out business managers' liability.
II. Functions of the Supervisory Board
In order to determine the impact and scope of liability, one should examine the
legal functions of the supervisory board. These functions represent directors'
duties. If the directors violate these duties in a negligent or willful manner, they
expose themselves to liability under sections 116 and 93.
Section 116 is the basic provision for directors' liability. With regard to their
duties, their standards of care, and their responsibility, this norm expressly refers
6. See M. LurrER, supra note 4, at 232.
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to the business managers' legal basis of liability as laid down in section 93.
According to section 116, in conjunction with section 93, subsection 1, the
director's standard of care is that of a diligent and prudent businessperson. The
members are jointly and severally liable to the company for a breach of their
duties. Section 93, subsection 3, spells out specific breaches of legal duties,
focusing mainly on the maintenance of share capital.
A. SUPERVISION OF THE MANAGEMENT
The main function of the supervisory board of an AG is to supervise the
management (section 111, subsection 1) by means of the control and inspection
of the managers' actions.7 The management has the right and the obligation to
run the corporation, and the supervisory board may not interfere. The business
managers lead the company independently. 8 The directors may not take over
certain tasks of the management. The law expresses a clear distinction between
managers and directors. According to section 105, subsection 1, directors may
not at the same time be, or act as, managers and vice versa. The supervision of
the management includes the inspection of their dealings in terms of legality,
economy, and utility.9 Due to the broadness of this scheme one can easily sense
the conflict: if the directors over emphasize control of the management, they
might interfere with the legal status of management and the manager's legal duty
to run the company independently. If, however, the directors inspect the exec-
utive board too leniently, the directors are exposed to liability.
In order to implement its supervisory duties, the board may, among other
things, inspect and supervise the books, records, and assets of the corporation.'o
The directors may call shareholders' meetings, (section 111, subsection 3) and
approve certain transactions contemplated by the managers if the bylaws create
7. Judgment of Dec. 21, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 33 NJW 1629 (1980); HOFFMANN,
DER AUFSICHTSRAT note 100 (2d ed. 1985); Behrens, supra note 2, at 12; Conard, Supervision, supra
note 2, at 1465; Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power, supra note 2, at 400; Hommelhoff,
Zur Kredituiberwachung im Aufsichtsrat, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR WINFRIED WERNER, supra note 4, at 315,
318, 321; H.J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 93 note 33; Schilling, Die Uberwachungsaufgabe des
Aufsichtsrats, 26 AG 341 (1981); Schwark, supra note 4, at 841, 852; Semler, Aufgaben und
Funktionen des aktienrechtlichen Aufsichtsrats in der Unternehmenskrise, 28 AG 141, 148 (1983);
see Vagts, supra note 2, at 50.
8. AktG § 76(1). The basic principle has recently been reiterated by the Austrian Supreme
Court in its judgment of May 31, 1977, 28 AG, 81, 82 (1983). See also, ECKHARDT, supra note 4,
§ 84 note 23; HOFFMANN, supra note 7; Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power, supra note
2, at 400, 406; Hommelhoff, supra note 7, at 315, 318; Semler, supra note 7, at 83; Vagts, supra
note 2, at 50.
9. See Vagts, supra note 2, at 50; ECKHARDT, supra note 4, § 11I note 25; H.J. MERTENS,
supra note 4, vor § 95 note 2; MEYER & LANDRUT, supra note 2, § I t1 note 3; Grossfeld & Ebke,
Controlling Corporate Power, supra note 2, at 400; Schilling, supra note 7, at 341-42; Semler,
supra note 7, at 141-42.
10. AktG § 111(2); for detail, see M. LUTTER, supra note 4, at 86; Grossfeld & Ebke, Control-
ling Corporate Power, supra note 2, at 400; Vagts, supra note 2, at 51.
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such right of prior approval (section 111, subsection 4). Other typical functions
and tasks of the board of directors empower them to appoint and dismiss the
managers (section 84),1 to represent the corporation vis-A-vis managers (section
112),12 and to receive regular reports by management on all facets of the com-
pany's business and request additional reports (section 940). 1 3 Moreover, the
board may present proposals to the shareholders' meeting,' 4 submit suggestions
to the shareholders' meeting or to the court concerning the appointment of
auditors,' 5 examine and report in writing to the shareholders on the yearly
financial statements, 16 and approve the yearly financial statements. 1
7
This list is by no means exclusive. It reveals the board's far-reaching power.
Since its power is not at all restricted to legal issues, it may challenge any aspect
relating to the corporation. 18 One must bear in mind that the duty to supervise the
managers is all-encompassing; it represents an integral part of German corporate
governance. The voluntary supervisory board of a GmbH often has many of the
same rights and duties as the board of an AG, clearly distinct from those of the
managers. Thus, the concept of control of an AG and a GmbH can be summa-
rized as follows: with respect to the management of the corporation, the super-
visory board assumes a significant role in the decision-making process; only
issues resulting in a fundamental change in corporate structure require action of
the shareholders' meeting.
B. SUPERVISORY BOARD'S ABILITY TO FORM COMMITTEES
Realizing the variety of legal tasks resting on the directors, the question arises
whether they can delegate functions to committees. Section 107, subsection 3,
sentence 1, grants the power to the supervisory board to establish one or more
committees. The directors may transfer various matters to personnel, finance,
and planning committees. Accordingly, the directors may appoint certain board
members as committee members. The freedom of the directors to form commit-
tees and to appoint members, as part of their right to organize their own affairs,
11. HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 103 & No. 200; M. LUTrER, supra note 4, at 4; Conard,
Supervision, supra note 2, at 1465; Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power, supra note 2,
at 400; Vagts, supra note 2, at 52.
12. HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 228; Vagts, supra note 2, at 52.
13. Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power, supra note 2, at 400; Vagts, supra note 2,
at 51; see also Semler, supra note 7, at 141, 148 (special emphasis on the crisis of an enterprise); for
detail, see HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 246; M. LUTTER, supra note 4, at 2.
14. AktG § 124(3); M. LUTTER, supra note 4, at 21; HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 318.
15. AktG § 124(3); Handelsgesetzbuch [HGBI § 318(3) & (4) Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1.] 219
(German Commercial Code).
16. AktG § 171; Vagts, supra note 2, at 51.
17. AktG § 171(3); HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 307; Schilling, supra note 7, at 341, 343.
18. For further details of the German system, see A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS, supra note 2, at
81-84; M. EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 177-85; Eckert, supra note 2, at 27; Grossfeld, Manage-
ment, supra note 2, § 5, at 607; Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power, supra note 2, at
406; Roth, supra note 2, passim; Schoenbaum & Lieser, supra note 2, at 91.
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has recently been stressed by the German Supreme Court for Civil Matters in
various cases.' 9
In addition, directors have the right to ask for external experts' advice on
certain matters, in particular, when examining the company's books and
records. 20 The German Supreme Court for Civil Matters has ruled in the famous
Hertie decision that a supervisory board member has no grounds on which to
have the company's books and records inspected by an expert on a broad and
general basis. 2 1 In that case a director claimed to have generally inspected the
company's business statements with the assistance of an external auditor. The
judges underlined the basic principle that directors cannot delegate their func-
tions to other persons; only with regard to specific questions may they ask for
external experts' advice, which can only be decided on a case-by-case basis.22
The law prescribes that certain material functions cannot be shifted to com-
mittees or external experts. Section 107, subsection 3, sentence 2, expressly lists
various tasks that are mandatorily reserved to the board of directors. Among
those tasks are appointing or dismissing the management, calling shareholders'
meetings, and examining annual financial statements of the company for ap-
proval. In addition, the directors, as a whole, must conduct a general inspection
of the management, review the regular reports by the management, and select
and inspect the committees and their members. 23 These remarks lead to the
conclusion that directors may not delegate their legal functions on an indiscrim-
inate basis; the German Supreme Court for Civil Matters has confirmed this
notion.
24
III. Codetermination by Workers and the
Influence on the Supervisory Board
German labor codetermination has broadened the scope of the directors' re-
sponsibility. Various forms of labor (workers) codetermination have been intro-
duced to the German legal system. The generally accepted catchword for such
19. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 83 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDES-
GERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZI 144, 148-49 (the Dynamit Nobel case); Judgment of Feb. 25,
1982, BGH, 83 BGHZ 106, 118, 119 (the Siemens case); HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 147; M.
LUTrER, supra note 4, at 110; Hommelhoff, supra note 7, at 315, 324; Schwark, supra note 4 at 841.
20. AktG §§ 109(l), 111(2); Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power, supra note 2, at
400.
21. Judgment of Nov. 15, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 85 BGHZ 293 (the Hertie case).
22. AktG § 111(5); Judgment of Nov. 15, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 85 BGHZ 293, 296,
297, 300.
23. A. BAUMBACH, supra note 2, § 107 note 13; HANAU & ULMER, CODETERMINATION ACT
(MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ), §§ 120, 130 (1981); HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 147; M. LuTrER,
supra note 4, at 110; MEYER & LANDRUT, supra note 2, § 116 note 4; Hommelhoff, supra note 7,
at 315, 324; Schwark, supra note 4, at 841, 846; Semler, supra note 7, at 81, 83.
24. Judgment of Nov. 15, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 85 BGHZ 293, 300 (the Hertie case);
see the earlier Judgment of June 5, 1975, BGH 64 BGHZ 325, 331, 332 (the Bayer case); see also
M. LUrTER, supra note 4, at 135, 176.
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actions is "industrial democracy." The supervisory board serves as the platform
for labor influence. De lege lata and de legeferenda labor codetermination takes
place only on the supervisory board level. According to a recent report of the
German Corporate Law Commission, there shall be no labor codetermination in
the shareholders' meeting or in the business management. 25 If certain prerequi-
sites are fulfilled, as shown below, companies are compelled to form a
supervisory board with a mandatory quorum being composed of labor dele-
gates. In particular, various close corporations with a specified number in the
work force are legally bound to form a supervisory board.26 Because of the
growing number of mandatory supervisory boards, the issue of directors'
liability now attracts attention. In order to point out the influence of labor
codetermination on the supervisory board, a short overview concerning the
relevant codetermination acts is necessary. Special stress is placed on the
Codetermination Act of 1976.
A. VARIOUS FORMS OF CODETERMINATION, ASIDE FROM
THE CODETERMINATION ACT OF 1976
In the early 1950s, different systems of codetermination were established for
the coal-mining, iron, and steel-producing industries, with a strengthened parity
system in the supervisory board. In addition, according to the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (the Act) of 1952 and 1972, codetermination was set up for
AGs and larger GmbHs with a one-third labor participation in the supervisory
board. Sections 76 and 77 of the 1952 Act, which are still binding law, apply to
companies in the form of an AG or to partnerships limited by shares (Komman-
ditgesellschaft aufAktien), which by reason of their corporate organization have
to form a mandatorily required supervisory board. Furthermore, the Act applies
to GmbHs employing more than 500, but fewer than 2,001, employees.
B. CODETERMINATION ACT OF 1976
The new Codetermination Act27 was published on May 4, 1976, and entered
into force on July 1, 1976. After a transitional period of about two years, the law
has now become fully effective.
The Codetermination Act was challenged on a constitutional basis. However,
the German Constitutional Court upheld the Codetermination Act in its
25. Claussen, supra note 5, at 7; for further details on Codetennination, see Conard, Supervi-
sion, supra note 2, at 1483; Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power, supra note 2, at
427-3 1; Grossfeld & Ebke, Problems, supra note 2, at 99 n. 190 (with reference to several author-
ities); Hopt, supra note 2, at 1343; Raiser, supra note 2, at 114-21; Teubner, supra note 2, at 151;
Vagts, supra note 2, at 65-79.
26. M. LUTrER, supra note 4, at 232 (refers to the various Acts).
27. Gesetz fiber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer (Codetermination Act), W. Ger., of 5
May 1976, BGBI.I 1189 (1976).
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landmark-decision on March 1, 1979.28 Therefore, the Codetermination Act of
1976 forms an integral part of the German legal system. The court pointed out
that, under the Codetermination Act, the shareholders still retained a slight edge
in voting power on the supervisory board. The Codetermination Act has a sig-
nificant impact on corporate law and, in particular, on the large AGs and the
GmbHs.
The basic requirements for the application of the Codetermination Act are that
the companies are organized as corporations, or like corporations, and the com-
pany or the group of companies employ more than 2,000 people (section 1,
subsection 1 of the Codetermination Act). The most significant facet of the new
law is a strengthening of the labor unions. To appreciate fully the scope of the law
one must again look at the German two-tier system. The influence of labor has
an effect on the supervisory board. Generally speaking, labor forms half of this
body. Thus, labor mainly affects the selection of the management. Furthermore,
labor can try to block decisions of the management.
Codetermination, within the relevant form of legal organization, is accom-
plished through the composition of the supervisory board. Depending on the
number of employees, the supervisory board will consist of twelve, sixteen, or
twenty members, half of whom will be representatives from the labor side.
Along with the representatives of the employees, there are, depending on the size
of the supervisory board, two or three labor union representatives (section 7 of
the Codetermination Act).
The chairman is the key player or quarterback of the supervisory board. In
case of a tie vote on board resolutions, the chairman has a casting vote (section
29, subsection 2 of the Codetermination Act).
Among the members of the executive management, one member will be the
so-called Arbeitsdirector or works director (section 33 of the Codetermination Act).
This works director's responsibilities are linked to company personnel matters.
C. THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
BY THE SUPERVISORY BOARD
Under the new Codetermination Act, the board's procedure for appointing the
business management differs substantially from the procedure for an ordinary
resolution. Section 31 of the Codetermination Act states that sections 84 and 85
of the AktG apply. This change is significant, especially for the GmbH, which is
subject to the new law. According to the GmbHG, the sovereign body of GmbH
is the shareholders' meeting, which in the past either appointed the managers
itself or delegated this power to an administrative or supervisory board (sections
45, 46 No. 5 of the GmbHG). Now, mandatorily, for every enterprise subject to
28. Judgment of Mar. 1, 1979, Bundesverfassungsgericht, (BVerfG), 50 BVERFGE 290 (1979),
32 NJW 699 (1979).
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the new law, the codetermined supervisory board is the only body empowered
and entitled to appoint the managers. Sections 25 and 31 of the Codetermination
Act supersede contrary GmbHG provisions.
The chairman's role as key player of the supervisory board is stressed in
another situation. If the required majority for appointing the business manage-
ment cannot be attained, the chairman has a casting vote in a new ballot (section
32, subsection 4 of the Codetermination Act). Of equal importance is that,
according to section 84, subsection 1 of the AktG, the appointment of managers
may not be made for a period exceeding five years. What was envisaged as a
means of corporate protection (the AG and its many shareholders were supposed
to be protected from managers who after a time proved to be inefficient) now
turns into a device that gives even more control to the codetermined body and
codetermination as such. The managers who stand for reappointment by the
supervisory board are more dependent on this body than if their appointment was
for an indefinite period. A substantial part of corporate governance is shifted to
the supervisory board.
Appointment generally means a corporate act whereby the managers become
members of the managing body, the business management. It does not mean the
employment contract. German law makes a sharp distinction between these two
acts. In the case of a GmbH, coming under the Codetermination Act, it has been
severely disputed whether the power to enter into an employment contract with
the business managers is also vested to the supervisory board or whether this
power still belongs to the shareholders' meeting according to the concept of the
GmbHG.
Several lawsuits have resulted. Among others, the Reemtsma case was brought
to the German Supreme Court for Civil Matters. In that case the labor represen-
tatives of the supervisory board challenged the company's bylaws that granted
the power of the conclusion of business managers' employment contracts entirely
to the shareholders' meeting. The judges held that because of the close connec-
tion between the appointment and the conclusion of employment contracts of
business managers, both functions belonged to the supervisory board's sphere of
powers and duties.
29
D. SHAREHOLDERS' DOMINANCE PRESCRIBED BY
GERMAN LAW AND CORPORATE BYLAWS
Apart from the AG with a supervisory board as a legal prerequisite, the
Codetermination Act has a special impact on the GmbH with more than 2,000
employees. Such large GmbHs must also have a supervisory board. The board's
mandatory powers, as granted by law, must be recognized and obeyed. Accord-
ing to sections 25 and 31 of the Codetermination Act and sections 84, 85 and 111
29. Judgment of Nov. 14, 1983, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 89 BGHZ 48, 54 (the Reemtsma
case).
VOL. 25, NO. I
SUPERVISORY BOARD DIRECTORS 51
of the AktG, the supervisory board appoints and dismisses the business manag-
ers, is responsible for their employment contracts, and has other substantial
rights and duties as shown above. It should be noted that for a GmbH coming
under the Codetermination Act, the shareholders' meeting is the dominant gov-
erning body of the company. The shareholders' meeting remains empowered
either to give management immediate directives or to decide management mea-
sures itself, which then need only be carried out by the management (as written
down in sections 37, subsection 1, 45, subsection 1, 46, No. 5 of the GmbHG).
Consequently, the bylaws may contain a catalogue of business matters that need
the shareholders' approval. In case of conflict, the shareholders prevail as long
as the supervisory board's previously mentioned mandatory rights and its auton-
omy as such are safeguarded. The German Supreme Court for Civil Matters has
taken this viewpoint in recent decisions.
30
Furthermore, the chairman of the supervisory board serves to maintain the
shareholders' dominance in terms of corporate governance. As pointed out, his
casting vote can overcome deadlock situations. Pursuant to the complicated
procedure of section 27 of the Codetermination Act, the shareholders elect the
chairman, who is supposed to act as their "long arm" on the supervisory board.
E. CONSEQUENCES AND ISSUES RESULTING FROM "INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY"
The "industrial democracy" of the Codetermination Act has established man-
datory supervisory boards, with limited liability, in various large companies.
Furthermore, the directors are also recruited from the work force and the unions.
An issue remains as to whether labor codetermination really changes the distri-
bution of power and influence within the corporation. Certain consequences
related to the directors' remuneration, provided for by section 113, can be drawn;
one notices a decrease, or at least a reduced increase, of the remuneration in a
number of companies.
However, critical issues remain unsolved. Labor directors are confronted with
the dilemma of conflicting interests and loyalties. It can be questioned whether
the labor representatives' expertise is sufficient for the multifaceted functions of
a supervisory board. The debate on a reduction of the directors' standard of care
lingers on and is analyzed in section V of this article.
IV. Directors' Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties
A. THE GENERAL SCOPE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Bearing in mind the labor participation on the supervisory board, directors
performing their duties are often torn between various interests. However, all
30. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1982, BGH, 83 BGHZ 106 (the Siemens case); Judgment of Feb. 25,
1982, BGH, 83 BGHZ 144 (the Dynamit Nobel case); Judgment of Feb. 25, 1982, BGH, 83 BGHZ
151 (the Bilfinger und Berger case).
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members of the board, by virtue of their appointment to this position, owe the
company a duty to avoid conflict-of-interest situations.
1. Bankers on the Board
Such conflicts of interest can particularly arise with bank representation on the
supervisory board. Under a universal banking system, like the one in Germany,
that allows banks to engage in the full range of commercial and investment
banking activities, bank representation on the boards of corporations is very
common. The German practice of having bank delegates on the supervisory
board has been regularly observed since the early nineteenth century and has had
important internal and external functions. Bank representation on the board,
together with other influences exercised by the banks on the corporations, has
emerged as one of the decisive notions in the fast developing merger (and
oligopoly) scene in the German trade, insurance, and banking industries.
Various conflicts of interest can occur for a bank's director. The director might
use secret information of the corporation for other clients. Or the director might
pass confidential data to the bank that results in an extension or, in the negative
event, a reduction of a credit line. Also, the complex problem of multiple
loyalties arises.
In particular, the problem of insider trading comes up. The U.S. reader must realize
that unlike the U.S. securities laws, German law does not provide specific rules on
insider trading. Therefore, a bank representative on a supervisory board may use
special information and influence to initiate an acquisition of that company by one
of the bank's other industrial clients. This issue has recently been discussed con-
cerning the takeover of AEG by the car-manufacturer Daimler-Benz.
31
2. Directors Serving on Several Boards, Interlocking Directorates
Representatives of banks are not the only directors who face the problem of
multiple loyalties. This critical issue also appears in the case of ordinary directors
serving on several boards and thus leads to the present discussion of the law of
interlocking directorates in Germany and in the United States. 32 German law
allows an individual to be a member of the boards of several corporations.
Interlocking personnel is regarded as a legally accepted device for acquiring
corporate control. German law, however, prohibits cross-membership on the
management and supervisory boards of two or more corporations (section 100,
subsection 2). Under generally accepted German legal opinion, the directors'
31. See Frankfurter Allgemeine, Dec. 3, 1985, note 280, at 13; concerning the banker's influ-
ence and depositary vote, see Vagts, supra note 2, at 53-58; the system of obtaining proxies is
described and evaluated by Grossfeld, Management, supra note 2, at 1341-42; see also Grossfeld &
Ebke, Controlling Corporate Power, supra note 2, at 412-15; Raiser, supra note 2, at 1113.
32. For further discussion of interlocking directorates, see most recently Ebke, Interlocking
Directorates, 19 ZRG 50-106 (1990), with a detailed analysis of U.S. law; see also Behrens, supra
note 2, at 15-16.
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loyalty must be evenly divided between the different corporations. To this end,
the director must base decisions on each board only on the interest of the re-
spective corporation, keep each corporation's business secrets without using
them for the benefit of other corporations, and devote time and energy to these
corporations in proportion to the time mandated by each of them. 33 These state-
ments highlight the variety of directors' duties as well as the standard of care in
exercising them. It follows that a director is exposed to greater liability while
serving on several boards due to the dilemma of multiple loyalties.
In order to limit divided loyalties and the overload of a director's work re-
sulting from several board memberships, the law restricts the number of direc-
torships. Under section 100, subsection 2, sentence 1, no person may sit on more
than ten boards of companies that are required by law to establish a board. This
limitation does not pertain to companies that have a voluntary board.
3. No Justification of a Conflicts-of-Interest Situation
German Court decisions and legal literature have emphasized that conflicting
interests of another company where the director also serves on the board do not
justify any act by the board even if that act was in furtherance of the interest of
another company on which the director also serves as a board member. Fulfill-
ment of a duty in one case does not legitimate breach of duty in the other.
34
Directors' liability appears to be a severe problem in this context. A solution
cannot easily be found.
When a conflict of interest arises, the member should abstain from participat-
ing in the particular decision involving that conflict by not voting. In the case of
a continuing conflict-of-interest situation, the director should resign from the
board. A director who reacts differently is potentially liable for damages under
sections 116 and 93. These considerations are valid in all cases where there is a
board, mandatory or not, and thus for both an AG and a GmbH. These remarks
also pertain to labor directors who often face a conflict of interest, in particular
when a strike of the work force occurs.3 5
B. SPECIFIC CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
With regard to the full range of conflicts of interest only a few of the typical
conflict situations can be examined.
33. For further details concerning the issue of multiple loyalties, see M. LUrmR, supra note 4,
at 121-28; Behrens, supra note 2, at 15-16.
34. Judgment of Mar. 26, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 29 AG 181, 185; Judgment of Dec.
21, 1979, BGH, 33 NJW 1629, 1630 (1980); Judgment of Oct. 12, 1940, Reichsgericht, RG, 165
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 68, 79; A. BAUMBACH, supra note 2,
§ 111 note 4; HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 500, 501; H.J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 93 note 22;
see also M. LUTrrER, supra note 4, at 121-28; MESTMACKER, VERWALTUNG, KONZERNGEWALT UND
RECHT DER AKTIONARE 253, 254 (1958); Hopt, supra note 2, at 1360; Ulmer, Aufsichtsratsmandat
und Interessenkollision, 33 NJW 1603, 1604 (1980).
35. HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 500, 501; for detail, see Hopt, supra note 2, at 1359-62.
SPRING 1991
54 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
1. Personal Self-Dealing
Personal self-dealing seems historically to be a prototype of directors' conflicts
of interest and one of the earliest regulated. A conflict between corporate interest
and directors' personal self-interest has always existed. The oldest, and at the
same time most simple, legal approach to this conflict is the strict prohibition of
any such transaction. Presently, German courts apply a broader, more sophisti-
cated "general fairness" test. There is no outright prohibition of transactions in
connection with personal self-dealing.
The courts may interfere on a case-by-case basis, and it is difficult to state
sound general criteria. This concept of fairness, based on the notion of Treu und
Glauben (good faith) in the sense of section 242 of the German Civil Code,
grants judicial discretion and invites the court to do equity. 36 Furthermore,
personal self-dealing of supervisory board members could incur directors' lia-
bility pursuant to sections 93 and 116. The misuse of the member's powers to the
detriment of the company could also be construed as fraud and as a breach of
trust and, therefore, could trigger criminal sanctions under sections 263 and 266
of the German Criminal Code.
2. Use of Corporate Opportunity
A director should refrain from private deals that are offered in connection with
the director's function within the corporation. The company has the right to
consider any offer in the line of its business and to claim all relevant business
opportunities. 37 Whereas a highly developed doctrine of corporate opportunity
has emerged in the United States, no such distinct doctrine exists in Germany.
Directors' misuse of corporate opportunity falls into the all-embracing scheme of
directors' liability based on sections 93 and 116.38
3. Corporate Secrecy
The use of corporate information represents another conflict of interest issue
that is sometimes treated as part of the corporate opportunity doctrine. 39 In
German jurisprudence similar results are achieved by the doctrine of corporate
secrets that the director may not reveal or use for the director's own or other
persons' benefit. Section 116 and section 93, subsection 1, sentence 2, express
a basic director's duty to keep all company secrets in strictest confidence. This
requirement can be easily understood since all board members must be ac-
36. G. WIEDEMANN, I GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (COMPANY LAW) 346 (1980); Kfibler, Erwerbschan-
cen und Organpflichten, Uberlegungen zur Entwicklung der Lehre von den "corporate opportuni-
ties," in FESTSCHRIFr FUR WINFRIED WERNER, supra note 4, at 437, 438.
37. See SCHOLZ-SCHNEIDER, GMBH-GESETZ, § 43 note 144 (6th ed. 1978); Kfibler, supra note 36
at 437, 438; MESTMACKER, supra note 34, at 166; for an American perspective, see Brudney & Clark,
A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 998 (1981).
38. Kiibler, supra note 36, at 437, 446.
39. Brudney & Clark, supra note 37, at 1007, 1040; Hopt, supra note 2, at 1359-62.
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quainted with all relevant matters pertaining to the management of the com-
pany.40 Thus, the directors are provided with significant data of the corporation,
including secret information. The German Legislature has realized the com-
pany's need for protection, and in section 404 it has mandated the imposition of
criminal sanctions on directors who expose corporate secrets.
Apart from the problem of the exact definition of the corporate secret, 4' which
is beyond the scope of this article, another issue arises with respect to where to
draw the line between the company's legitimate sphere of secrecy and disclosure
to the supervisory board in general, as well as to labor and to the public. A
precise line can only be drawn by the courts.
In the Bayer case the German Supreme Court for Civil Matters dealt with
several issues resulting from corporate secrecy. 42 The plaintiff in that case, a
director from the labor side, challenged the supervisory board's rules on corpo-
rate secrets as illegal; in the plaintiff's view the board's rules intensified the
pertinent provisions of the AktG. The Supreme Court judges allowed the plain-
tiff's complaint and held that the directors' duty to keep corporate secrets could
not be hardened by corporate bylaws or business rules. This legal duty resulted
from a subtle balance between the company's interest in keeping business secrets
and the directors' need as members of an independent body of the corporation to
freely express their opinion.43
Since labor codetermination came into effect, particularly under the Codeter-
mination Act of 1976, one of the most important institutional conflicts of interest
is corporate secrecy. The workers of the corporation, and even more so the
unions, request first-hand information from the board. They want to use the data
as a basis and as a device for their strategy within the corporation itself and,
furthermore, on the level of the sphere in which the specific corporation is active
or even within the economy as a whole. Leading German legal writers deny the
validity of such requests, stating that in introducing the Codetermination Act the
German Legislature did not intend to grant the unions far-reaching disclosure
devices with substantial political impact. 44
4. Fiduciary Duties
Directors must, by reason of their fiduciary duties, avoid possible conflicts of
interest. As shown above, the supervisory board members owe several fiduciary
40. H.J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 93 n.37; Schilling, supra note 2; § 93 note 11; for detail,
see M. LutrrER, supra note 4, at 4; Schwark, supra note 4, at 841, 847.
41. See Claussen, Ober die Vertraulichkeit im Aufsichtsrat, 26 AG 57, 58 (1981); see also
HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 261; M. LurrER, supra note 4, at 129, 130.
42. Judgment of June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 64 BGHZ 323; M. LurrER, supra note
4, at 121, 123-24; Schilling, supra note 2, § 93 note 8; Hopt, supra note 2, at 1361-62.
43. Judgment of June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 64 BGHZ 327 (1975).
44. See M. LUTrrER, supra note 4, at 123, 124, 187; Hopt, supra note 2, at 1360-62; Schwark,
supra note 4 at 841, 847.
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duties to the company. Under German corporate law these duties are called
Loyalitts- und Treupflichten.45
Pursuant to another development of German courts and jurisprudence, the
directors are bound to the Unternehmensinteresse, that is (literally translated), the
"interest of the company." The directors' duty to safeguard the Unternehmen-
sinteresse has been underlined by the German Constitutional Court examining.
the Codetermination Act of 197646 and by the German Supreme Court for Civil
Matters in the previously mentioned Bayer and Hertie cases.4 Both in the Bayer
and in the Hertie decisions, the Supreme Court's holdings obligate the directors
to the "interest of the company." The rationale emphasizes that this expressly
refers to labor directors.4 8
Parallel to the American fiduciary duty, the function of the Unternehmensin-
teresse appears to draw conclusions from the phenomenon of separation of own-
ership and control. The legal concept acknowledges the directors' autonomy and
tries to compensate for it by the imposition of the foregoing obligations. Again,
corporate governance comes into play.
It is questionable whether the previously mentioned directors' duties can lit-
erally be translated as "fiduciary" duties, in the sense of U.S. doctrine. The
development of the concepts of trust and of fiduciary responsibility in Anglo-
Saxon law is too different from many continental legal systems, including the
German system. From a German point of view, in summary, the directors face a
variety of duties resulting from different conflicts of interest. If they breach any
of these duties they might be exposed to liability. Facing the multitude of direc-
tors' duties, one asks how the German law implements a legal basis of directors'
liability. This question is answered in the next section.
V. Legal Basis and Standards of Directors' Liability
A. RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS
1. Sections 93 and 116 as "Basic Norms"
The AktG expressly provides, in section 116, for liability of the members of
the board of directors. Section 116 refers to section 93, stating that this provision
concerning business managers' liability also applies to directors. It thereby es-
45. M. LUTrER, supra note 4, at 200, 211; H.J. MERTENS, supra note 2, § 93 note 20; Kiibler,
supra note 36, at 437, 448; Schilling, supra note 2, § 93 note 10; Ulmer, supra note 34, at 1603,
1606 (1980).
46. Judgment of Mar. 1, 1979, 50 BVerfG 290, 374, 32 NJW 699 (1979).
47. Judgment of Nov. 15, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 85 BGHZ 293 (1983) (the Hertie
case) and Judgment of June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 64 BGHZ 324, 330 (1975) (the Bayer
case); see M. LUTrER, supra note 4, at 200; Claussen, supra note 5, at 7; Hopt, supra note 2, at
1361-62; Schilling, supra note 7, at 341, 342.
48. Judgment of Nov. 15, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 85 BGHZ 293, 300 (1983) and
Judgment of June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 64 BGHZ 324 (1975); Hopt, supra note 2, at
1361-62.
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tablishes the legal basis and the standards for the performance of duties and, in
the breach thereof, for liability of both executive managers and directors.
49
The law applies a flexible standard of care and performance of duties. The
standard is that of a diligent and prudent businessperson or supervisory board
member. The complexity of the directors' duties has been revealed in section II,
concerning the board's functions and in section IV, regarding conflicts of interest
and fiduciary duties. The AktG refers to this discretionary test more often.
Section 309 and section 310 create liability for improper performance of duties
by the members of a company's administration if the company is controlled by,
or controls another, corporation on the basis of a "control or domination agree-
ment." Section 317 and section 318 spell out specific duties. The breach of those
duties will entail liability for the member of the administration of both the
controlled and the controlling company if this control is exercised only by virtue
of a majority shareholding.
The case may be different for GmbHs that are governed by the GmbHG. These
companies are not required to set up a board, except under the Codetermination
Act, where by virtue of size or type of business a supervisory board may be
mandatory and may be subject to the relevant provisions of the AktG. If a board
is established only by virtue of the company's bylaws, section 52 of the GmbHG
expressly stipulates liability of directors by reference to sections 116 and 93,
subsections 1 and 2, unless the bylaws provide differently, which is sometimes the
case. Section 52, subsection 1, of the GmbHG does not refer to section 43 of the
GmbHG, which functions as the general liability clause for the business man-
agers of a GmbHG and applies the same flexible standard of a prudent or
reasonable businessperson. Thus, according to section 52, subsection 1, of the
GmbHG, in a GmbH the legal basis for directors' liability may, more often than
in the case with the AG, be found in the bylaws. If, however, the GmbH comes
under the Codetermination Act of 1976, and the company must form a manda-
tory board, then section 116 applies, in accordance with section 25, subsection
1 No. 2, of the Codetermination Act of 1976.
2. "Groups of Companies"
The AktG contains rather extensive norms on related enterprises or so-called
"groups of companies" (sections 15 et seq. and sections 291 et seq.). Those
rules, among others, cover enterprises controlled by another enterprise by virtue
of a "control or domination agreement" or through a majority shareholder
(domination in fact, or de facto control). Various provisions provide for a far-
reaching liability of directors. The pertinent norms also apply the flexible con-
cept of the prudent reasonable businessperson. The results of a conference on
49. HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 504; M. LuT-rER, supra note 4, at 4; Schneider, Haftungsmild-
erung fiir Vorstandsmitglieder und Geschi4ftsfiihrer bei fehlerhafter Unternehmensleitung, in
FESTSCHRIF FUR WINFRIED WERNER, supra note 4, at 795, 799.
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Comparative Law Concerning "The Law of Corporations in Comparative Per-
spective" have recently stressed this flexible concept based on the acquisition of
control. sa
In a corporation dominated by contract the controlling enterprise obtains the
right to give instructions to the board of managers concerning the management
of the company. The managers of the controlled company must strictly observe
any lawful instruction forthcoming from the "parent." Harmful instructions to
the company are not necessarily considered unlawful as long as they serve the
interest of the combined enterprise as a whole. Section 309 implements liability
of the legal representatives of the controlling company, including the directors.
The standard is the diligence and care that a prudent or reasonable executive
should use in issuing instructions. The supervisory board of the controlling
company may therefore become liable if, because of insufficient supervision, the
executive managers are not prevented from issuing unlawful instructions to the
controlled company. Contrary to the liability rules of sections 116 and 93, share-
holders and creditors of the controlled company may assert claims for damages
against the directors of the controlled company. Under section 310, the directors
of the controlled company may be jointly and severally liable with those of the
parent if, for example, the directors, for lack of proper supervision, fail to
prevent the managers of the controlled company from following an unlawful
instruction from the parent company.
In case of de facto control, the controlling enterprise may not give instructions
detrimental to the controlled company unless it provides for full monetary com-
pensation for business losses sustained due to instructions from the controlling
company. If the controlling company fails to do so, it incurs liability for damages
jointly and severally with its legal representatives, including the directors .5 The
most important duties of the directors of the controlled company are to review
the so-called "controlled company report" and to report to the shareholders. The
50. Twelfth International Conference on Comparative Law, see, e.g., Behrens, supra note 2, at
16-26. For a more recent example, see Das Gesellschaftsrecht der Konzerne im internationalen
Vergleich. Ein Symposium des Max-Planck-Instituts far ausldndisches und internationales Priva-
trecht, Conference held in Hamburg, Nov. 30-Dec. 1, 1989 (1990), including among others: Ebke,
Die Konzernierung im US-amerikanischen Recht; Hommelhoff, Gesellschaftsformen als Organisa-
tionselemente im Konzernaufbau; Sonnenschein, Der Schutz von Minderheitsgesellschaftern und
Gldubigern der abhingigen Gesellschaft. For further details concerning German law, see M. LuTrER,
supra note 4, at 41 (duty to report within groups of companies) & 151 (duty of confidentiality within
groups of companies); Lutter, Stand und Entwicklung des Konzernrechts in Europa, 16 ZRG 324-
369 (1987); for a discussion of the problem of codetermination in groups of companies, see Hopt,
supra note 2, at 1362-63; regarding the problem of interlocking directorates in groups of companies,
see Ebke, supra note 32, at 103-05; from the standpoint of Comparative Law, see B. GROSSFELD,
MACHT UND OHNMACHT DER RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 67 (1984); for the perspective of an American
lawyer, see Buxbaum, Extension of Parent Company Shareholders' Rights to Participate in the
Governance of Subsidiaries, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 11 (1983); M. EISENBERG, supra note 2, at
213-315.
51. AktG § 317(10), (3); for a more detailed overview, see Behrens, supra note 2, at 22-23; see
also Raiser, supra note 2, at 119.
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directors will be liable if they breach this duty with respect to damaging dealings
with the controlling enterprise or with respect to instructions issued by the
controlling company.52 Once again, the discretionary standard of care of a dil-
igent and prudent businessperson is applicable.
In the situation of controlled and controlling enterprises the directors' liability
is not shifted to the controlling enterprise, although the scope of activities of the
board of the controlled company, and accordingly the scope of its liability, may
be somewhat restricted. It is noteworthy that the directors' exposure to liability
within the broad field of the law of controlled and controlling enterprises depends
on the prudent or reasonable businessperson's judgment and, therefore, how this
flexible standard is construed and applied in each individual case. One can
conclude the following: powers of control should be counterbalanced by respec-
tive responsibilities. The devices of acquiring control vary accordingly, as do the
liabilities and duties and obligations resulting from the exertion of control.
Directors' liability can also result in criminal sanctions, for example, for severe
cases of fake representations and for breach of the duty of strict confidentiality
regarding company secrets (sections 399, 400, 404). Because managerial control
has shifted to outside entrepreneurial interest, German law, in addition to
establishing liability where control is abused, focuses on the attempt to protect
shareholders and creditors against risks resulting from a corporation's loss of
decisional autonomy and financial integrity.
53
B. STANDARDS OF DUTY AND CARE
1. Flexible Concept of a Prudent Businessperson
The scope and broadness of liability in performing particular duties depend
upon what may be reasonably demanded from directors performing such duties
in light of relevant legal provisions and good business practices and customs.
54
Sections 116 and 93 also set the standards for liability of directors. Directors are
responsible for performing their supervisory duties with the care of a diligent and
prudent businessperson who has been appointed director. Generally, this provi-
sion not only encompasses the duties of directors that are expressly mentioned in
the provisions governing directors, but also ensures the proper performance of
duties not spelled out.
55
As shown above, various norms of the AktG apply the prudent businessperson
test. This broad test serves as a flexible approach in order to achieve a satisfac-
52. AktG § 318(2); as to the directors' duty to examine the "controlled company report," see
M. LuTrrTER, supra note 4, at 20; Behrens, supra note 2, at 23-24.
53. AktG §§ 399, 400, 404; for further details, see HOFFMANN, supra note 7, Nos. 260, 507; M.
LUTrrER, supra note 4, at 4, 145 & 193.
54. H.J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 93 note 33.
55. See HOFFMANN, supra note 7, note 504; M. Lu'ER, supra note 4, at 4; H.J. MERTENS,
supra note 4, § 93 note 19; Schilling, supra note 2, § 93 note 9; Schneider, supra note 49, at 795,
799.
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tory, adequate, reasonable result. Presently, the prudent or reasonable person, the
modem "golden rule," appears in various fields of American and German law.
The term functions as a means of evaluating the relevant legal behavior of human
beings. Thus, different standards of required behavior are established, for ex-
ample, the standards of a business-type situation, personified by the prudent or
reasonable businessperson. It is not feasible to give a precise definition of a
bonus socius; by the same token, it appears to be unfeasible to describe exactly
the reasonable businessperson. The courts have the final say based on sound
reasoning from case to case.
2. Minimum Standard
Generally speaking, the board members are part-time directors who work
mainly in other professions. From a practical standpoint they can devote only a
certain amount of time to their supervisory board duties. The law takes this
situation into account; section 110, subsection 3, provides for, in general, at least
two meetings of the supervisory board per calendar year.
The directors must have a general insight into management and business
conditions and must also understand the interrelations between business and
society. Expert knowledge regarding the company's particular line of business is
not generally required. With regard to codetermination, the representation of
employees on the board can only operate successfully if the unique contact these
members have with the daily work of the company and their insight into its
personnel policy are accepted by the shareholders' members of the supervisory
board as valuable expertise.
The principle of equal treatment of all directors, with an emphasis on labor
members, 56 does not allow a reduction or differentiation of the standard of care
for labor representatives because of their purportedly minimal standard of ex-
57pertise.
Not all board members can have the general insight into business life that
would be expected of those who, due to their profession, have expert knowledge.
All board members, however, should have or should acquire an exposure to the
fundamental structure of their particular company, as well as an elementary
knowledge of the framework and organization of corporations in general. The
board members should also be familiar with basic legal notions, such as corpo-
rate governance, conflicts of interest, and directors' (fiduciary) duties.
This minimum standard of directors' expertise is generally accepted among
German courts and scholars. In its Hertie decision the German Supreme Court
56. Judgment of June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 64 BGHZ 324, 325, 330 (1975);
HANAU & ULMER, supra note 23, § 25, Nos. 76, 100; M. LUTrER, supra note 4, at 187.
57. HANAU & ULMER, supra note 23, § 25, No. 118; HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 104; LurrER,
supra note 4, at 187; H.J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § I I note 25; Schwark, supra note 4, at 841, 842;
Semler, supra note 7, at 141, 145.
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for Civil Matters has stressed that each director must comply with certain min-
imum qualifications that enable the director to understand and decide on the
normal course of dealings of the company.58 Such a minimum basis of directors'
qualifications contains, for example, their ability to comprehend the company's
production line and annual balance sheet. The standard of care of a sensible
director is tied to this basis and generally leads to reasonable solutions. Liability
usually attaches only in cases of clear and unacceptable neglect of those mini-
mum duties.
3. Directors with Special Expertise
Individual supervisory board members may possess a specific expertise, for
example, on financial matters. In particular, the establishment and functioning of
special committees has lead to an increase in the standard of care regarding
expert knowledge. There is a tendency toward broader liability of directors with
special qualifications or expert knowledge, such as bankers, lawyers, certified
public accountants, or auditors.59
Due to the similarity of German and Austrian corporate law, German com-
mentators have paid much attention to a decision of the Austrian Supreme Court.
The Austrian Supreme Court has applied higher standards of bankers' duties of
care in the recent Krauland Bank case. 60 The court examined the bankers'
liability as directors of a company that had gone bankrupt. The judges pointed to
the bankers' education, experience, and other qualifications and held that their
legal expertise on the law of safeguarding credits in particular enabled them to
understand financial and economic affairs more deeply. Thus, the bankers were
exposed to broader liability. Because of the similar corporate law system, espe-
cially concerning the liability provisions, the court's holding is applicable to the
German discussion on directors' liability. Several German legal writers, there-
fore, recommend imposing such a higher standard of directors' duties upon
German supervisory board members.
6 1
It is somewhat astonishing for an American reader to note that German law
reporters do not contain many decided cases on directors' liability. Because there
are no class actions in Germany, a large number of cases involving directors'
liability, as can be found in the United States, simply does not exist. However,
58. Judgment of Nov. 15, 1982, Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, 85 BGHZ 293, 295, 296 (1983);
ECKHARDT, supra note 4, § 116 note 10; HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 505; H.J. MERTENS, supra
note 4, § I I I note 25; Hommelhoff, supra note 7 at 316, 322; Schilling, supra note 7, at 341, 342;
Schwark, supra note 4 at 841, 847 & 853; Semler, supra note 7, at 82, 83.
59. HOFFMANN, supra note 7, No. 505; Schneider, supra note 49, at 795, 796; Ulmer, supra note
45.
60. Judgment of May 31, 1977, Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) OGH, Aus., 28 AG 81,
82 (1983); see also Hommelhoff, supra note 7, at 841, 843, 849, 853; Semler, supra note 7, at 82,
83.
61. Hommelhoff, supra note 7, at 315, 322; Schwark, supra note 4, at 841-43, 849, 853;
Semler, supra note 7, at 82, 83.
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some new decisions underline the trend towards a broader liability of "expert
directors."
In a fairly new decision the Supreme Court for Civil Matters invoked the
liability of the chairman of the supervisory board, who had undoubtedly
breached his duties by consenting to illegal payments in favor of the company's
officers and third persons. 62 In the Beton- und Monierbau (BuM) case the court
disallowed the claim for the bankers' liability as directors of a large contractor
company that went bankrupt. 63 The administrator in bankruptcy proceedings
brought an action against the main creditor bank, the Westdeutsche Landesbank
(WestLB). The judges did not examine in great detail whether the bank repre-
sentatives actually violated their duties as directors of the supervisory board of
the company that went bankrupt; even if there was a violation, the defendant
bank could not be held liable for its employees' actions that allegedly occurred
on another company's (i.e., BuM's) supervisory board.64
The Appellate Court of Diisseldorf recently affirmed the liability of a certified
public accountant serving as a director on the ground that his professional ex-
pertise gave him the ability to analyze the company's financial situation.65
Furthermore, the District Court of Hamburg found a director liable based on
his expert knowledge as a banker. 66 The judges found a breach of his duties
because he influenced the company to issue a bill of exchange despite the com-
pany's critical financial state.
The standards of duty and care can be summarized as follows: The minimum
standard of a "prudent director's qualification" is a flexible test under which
liability is rarely imposed and, when it is, only in cases of clear neglect of duties.
Supervisory boards of larger enterprises, however, typically consist of "expert
directors" such as bankers, lawyers, certified public accountants, or auditors.
According to various modem court decisions their expertise exposes them to
broader liability.
C. LEGAL PREREQUISITES FOR DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
1. Fault and Negligence
Apart from breach of duties as stated in sections II and IV, the basic legal
prerequisites for directors' liability are fault and negligence.67 In determining
fault and negligence the courts have a substantial margin of discretion due to the
62. Judgment of Mar. 4, 1985, BGH, 30 AG 217 (1983).
63. Judgment of Mar. 26, 1984, BGH, 29 AG 181, 185 (1984).
64. Id.
65. Judgment of Mar. 8, 1984, Oberlandesgericht (Appellate Court) D~isseldorf, OLG, W. Ger.,
29 AG 273, 274 (1984).
66. Judgment of Dec. 16, 1980, Landericht (District Court) Hamburg, LG, W. Ger., 27 AG 51,
53 (1982).
67. MEYER & LANDRUT, supra note 2, § 93 notes 14 & 15; ECKHARDT, supra note 4, § 93 note
2; H.J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 93 note 12.
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flexibility or, more critically, the vagueness of the terms. What constitutes fault,
improper conduct, and negligence depends upon the requirements demanded by
the AktG and by the courts for the directors in the exercise of their various
duties. As shown above, the standard of care, the same on a minimum or expert
level, must be taken into account. The standard of care and proper performance
of duties is set on an objective level. Certain laxities among individual directors
must be omitted as irrelevant from a legal standpoint. 68 In addition, an individual
person's actual knowledge and ability to acquire knowledge must be considered.
Liability for improper performance of the duties of the board rests on the
individual directors and depends upon their personal acts. In order to be held
liable the individual member of the board must be in breach of duty. If more than
one member of the board is in breach of duty, each member will be jointly and
severally liable (sections 116 and 93, subsection 2, sentence 1).
It follows from the previously discussed topic that directors' liability contains
objective and subjective elements. The objective analysis determines whether
there is a breach of directors' duties, depending to a large extent on the standard
of care and performance of duties. Subjective elements are taken into account on
a second level, which focuses on the individual member in question, the mem-
ber's personal ability, and the member's actions in the relevant case. 6 9 The basic
liability provision, section 116, underlines this twofold approach; it contains the
terms "duty of care," the objective basis, and "responsibility," the individual or
subjective sphere.
2. Burden of Proof and Money Damages
According to section 116 and section 93, subsection 2, sentence 2, and other
similar provisions, the burden of proof is on the director to show that the act with
respect to which liability is asserted was not a breach of duty. This is a complete
deviation from the general rule of German civil procedure that a person seeking
to hold another person liable for a breach of duty must prove such a breach.7°
The same rule applies to the directors of a GmbH that has a mandatory super-
visory board. If there is a voluntary board, the rule applies unless the bylaws
provide to the contrary (section 52 of the GmbHG).
Directors liable in damages for breach of duty must make good the damage
resulting from such breach. Under section 249 of the German Civil Code, the
person liable generally owes restitution to the damaged party. With respect to
directors' liability, a money payment is usually necessary. The company, repre-
68. Judgment of Mar. 8, 1984, Oberlandesgericht, Dusseldorf, OLG, W. Ger., 29 AG 273, 275
(1984); for earlier cases, see Judgment of Nov. 17, 1932, Reichtsgericht, RG, 138 RGZ 320, 325
(1932) and Judgment of Mar. 17, 1930, Reichtsgericht, RG, 128 RGZ 39, 44; see also HANAU,
Commentary on German Civil Code [BGBI, in MONCHNER KOMMENTAR § 275 note 80 (2d ed. 1985);
M. LurER, supra note 4, at 193; Schwark, supra note 4, at 841, 844.
69. Schwark, supra note 4, at 841, 851.
70. H.J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 93 note 48; Schilling, supra note 2, § 93 note 17.
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sented by its business management, can bring an action against the director. 7 1
The corporation must prove the facts that show that damage resulted from a
particular event. On the other hand, if liability arises out of a situation in which
a director has exercised the duties laid down in section 93, subsection 3, which
mainly refers to the duties of safeguarding the company's share capital, it is
presumed that damage has occurred. Thus, the director would have to disprove
this presumption.
3. Beneficiaries of Liability Provisions
The liability provisions in sections 116 and 93 of the AktG and section 52 of
the GmbHG are aimed at the protection of the company. Consequently, in the
first instance only the company may assert liability against its directors. Con-
currently, the shareholders or third parties do not have a claim against the di-
rectors as long as the act in question constitutes a breach of duty covered by
sections 116 and 93.72 Only in a few cases, where liability provisions in the
AktG are specifically geared to the protection of the shareholders and third
parties, rather than to that of the company, may the shareholders bring a claim.
Such is the case under sections 92 and 401, which impose criminal sanctions, if
the directors fail to call the shareholders' meeting, because of the loss of more
than half of the company's share capital. Misrepresentation of the company's
economic situation is penalized in the same way by section 400, under which the
shareholders may bring an action based in tort.
Creditors of the company have a special position. They may assert the com-
pany's claim against the directors in place of the company, provided they cannot
recover their debts from the company.
4. Exclusion, Reduction, Settlement, and Waiver
of Directors' Liability; Statute of Limitations
The bylaws of an AG may not exclude or reduce directors' liability as provided
in the AktG. Section 23, subsection 5, expressly states that the bylaws cannot
exempt the mandatory provisions of the Act. Sections 93 and 116 are deemed to
be compulsive law. Therefore, no exclusion or reduction of liability can be
provided for by the bylaws. 74 On the other hand, the statutes may impose
additional liability, except for any extension of the scope of confidentiality as
71. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB], 18 January 1986, RGB 1.195 (German Civil Code); see M.
LUTTER, supra note 4, at 193.
72. HOFFMANN, supra note 7, note 504; Schneider, supra note 49, at 795, 799.
73. AktG §§ 116, 93(5), sent. 1; for further detail, see HOFFMANN, supra note 7, note 505;
Schneider, supra note 49, at 795.
74. With regard to the duty of confidentiality, see Judgment of June 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof,
BGH, 64 BGHZ 325, 326 (1975); Judgment of Mar. 8, 1984, Oberlandesgericht, Dusseldorf, OLG,
W. Ger., 29 AG 273, 276 (1984); ECKHARDT, supra note 4, § 93 note 23; H.J. MERTENS, supra note
4, § 76 note 19; Schilling, supra note 2, § 93 note 8; Schneider, supra note 49, at 795, 800.
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expressly prescribed by law. An increase in liability is rarely made and, in most
cases, the Act remains the main source for directors' liability. Furthermore, the
nature of the liability provisions of sections 116 and 93 excludes the possibility
of contracting out directors' liability or of contractually mitigating the standards
of liability below those of the AktG.
Whether a director can escape liability if outvoted by the other directors is
questionable. It would appear that a director who does not participate in the
execution of the resolution held unlawful may escape such liability. In such a
case, however, the board member would have to resign in order to be released
from liability for the consequences of such a resolution.
The company may not invoke a director's liability, if the wrongful act is the
result of a lawful resolution of the shareholders' meeting (section 93, subsection
4). This, however, cannot serve to release the board from its duty to supervise the
management. Therefore, calling a meeting of the shareholders, who normally
have less information relevant to the proper performance of the management,
will not necessarily exclude liability of the directors.
The company may only waive or settle a claim against a director after a waiting
period of three years after the claim came into existence, provided the general share-
holders' meeting consents to such waiver and dissenting votes by the minority do not
exceed 10 percent of the share capital of the company (section 93, subsection 4).
Again, the creditors of the company have a special position. Neither the lawful vote
of the shareholders' meeting nor the waiver or settlement by the company binds the
creditors, who, nevertheless, may claim damages from the directors concerned. The
statute of limitations on such claims is five years, running from the time the claim
for damages comes into existence (section 93, subsection 6). It may be shortened by
contract, but this may not serve to effect an illegal waiver.
Unless it has a mandatory supervisory board, the situation in a GmbH is
somewhat different in this respect. Section 52 of the GmbHG defines duties and
liabilities of directors of a voluntary board only by reference to sections 116 and
93, subsections I and 2. Thus, the GmbH may waive directors liability, except for
a willful breach of duty, or, if it does not, may settle in whatever way it thinks
fit. The statute of limitations is again five years, pursuant to section 52, subsec-
tion 2, of the GmbHG, and may be shortened.
VI. Liability Insurance
All in all, the previous discussion creates a large platform of directors' lia-
bility. Consequently, one might ask about adequate means of directors' liability
insurance schemes. In European countries the board members' liability is not
usually covered by liability insurance, quite contrary to the U.S. practice, the
75. AktG § 93(1) sent. 2, reiterated by the German Supreme Court for Civil Matters in the
Judgment of June 5, 1975, BGH, 64 BGHZ 325, 326; see also ECKHARDT, supra note 4, § 93 note
23; HANAU & ULMER, supra note 23, § 25, No. 113; M. LUtrrER, supra note 4, at 190.
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so-called "Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance" (D & 0 Insurance).
Board liability has not been considered as a serious professional liability in line
with that of lawyers, auditors, or real estate agents. Another reason why the
German insurance companies do not offer insurance is that, unlike in the United
States, a minority shareholder suit against a director by way of a class action is
not legally possible under German law. Hence, the numerous class actions
against directors of U.S. companies have not been experienced in Germany. In
view of this fact, German companies do not deem it to be of vital importance to
grant their directors the cover of insurance.
It is interesting for a European corporate lawyer to note that section 5j of
the U.S. Model Business Corporation Act expressly grants corporations the
power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of their directors, officers,
or other agents. The German insurance industry and, in particular, the German
Insurance Agency (Bundesaufsichtsamt far das Versicherungswesen) has taken
the position that, generally speaking, it is not feasible to take over the typical risk
of an entrepreneur.7 6 It remains to be seen whether this strict viewpoint will
gradually be revised. Presently, special insurance coverage is offered in
Germany, although at relatively high premiums. German insurance companies
may gradually discover the growing need and market for adequate insurance. At
the time being, the insurance cover is twofold: in most cases legal expense
insurance (Rechtsschutzversicherung) is used; third party liability insurance
(Haftpflichtversicherung) is rarely offered.77 This analysis leads to a distinct
suggestion: enforcing higher standards of care and enlarging the scope of duties
make it necessary to develop, as in the United States, a reasonably priced
supervisory board liability insurance scheme.
VII. Conclusion
Under the German two-tier system, the supervisory board is a cornerstone of
corporate governance. The AktG requires a supervisory board for AGs. GmbHs
may voluntarily institute a board, unless the Codetermination Law imposes a
duty to create a supervisory board. This article has noted the special legislation,
recent court decisions, and distinguished scholars' opinions that define the duties
of supervisory board members and assess what constitutes improper conduct and
what is the scope of liability. The main function of the part-time directors, who
often serve on several (but not more than ten) boards, is to control the business
management in an effective manner. The basic legal provisions concerning di-
rectors' liability, sections 93 and 116 of the AktG, contain a variety of flexible
terms and general clauses. Striking examples are the standard of care of a diligent
76. Schneider, supra note 49, at 795, 797, 798.
77. Chubb Market Letter, Apr. 1986, edited by Federal Chubb Insurance, Disseldorf branch;
National Union Feuerversicherungsgesellschaft, German Subsidiary of the American International
Group (AIG), Information Letter: "Directors & Officers Liability Insurance (D & 0)."
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and prudent (reasonable) businessperson, the concept of business secrets, and
conflicts of interest. The legal theories together create a great deal of judicial
discretion. Thus, the open issues can only be decided by the courts through
reasoning on a case-by-case basis.
The prevailing legal regime relating to the acquisition of control in corpora-
tions is founded on the notion that powers of control should be counterbalanced
by respective responsibilities. Such a notion enhances use of the liability device.
Liabilities imposed by German law upon controlling persons, corporations, and
directors are, therefore, not entirely based on the concept of abuse of control.
They represent part of an all-encompassing scheme shaped to condition the
legalization of a corporation's loss of decisional autonomy and financial integrity
by offering protection to its shareholders and creditors.7 s The aspects of the
corporate governance and control79 on the one hand lead to a broader scope of
responsibility and, finally, to liability on the other hand.
Recent developments in German corporate law reflect a departure from past
judicial reluctance to provide swift and comprehensive legal sanctions if
directors breach their duties. Their duties encompass the entire scope of the
corporation's business. The supervisory board of a large German company is
composed of members from the shareholders and labor side, in particular, from
the unions. Labor codetermination has a significant impact on directors' duties,
especially concerning corporate secrets. Modem court decisions strengthen the
fact that the individual board member must comply with a minimum standard of
business experience and expertise. That standard also applies to labor represen-
tatives on the supervisory board. "Expert directors," in particular, bankers,
lawyers, certified public accountants, and auditors, 80 are exposed to a higher
standard of care. Still, the scheme of the "prudent businessperson" turns out to
be a flexible device for the judges to reach an adequate decision in each indi-
vidual case.
Largely because there are no class actions as in the United States, only a few
German cases deal with directors' liability. Liability, therefore, is not a constant
danger for a director serving on the supervisory board. Nevertheless, the fol-
lowing can be gathered from some recent court decisions: the trend towards an
enlargement of directors' duties makes the position of a director more challeng-
ing; it also increases the directors' exposure to liability so that reasonable insur-
ance at a reasonable price might function as a necessary "parachute."
78. Expressly laid down by the Twelfth International Conference on Comparative Law; see
Behrens, supra note 2, at 25-26; see also Raiser, supra note 2, at 128-29; for further treatment
regarding corporate governance, see Hopt, supra note 2, at 1340-42; Teubner, supra note 2, at 155.
79. See Ebke, supra note 32, at 104-05 (concerning "control" within the board of groups of
companies and the "business judgment rule").
80. W. EBKE, WIRTSCHAFTPROFER UND DRrrTFHAFTUNG (1983) (a sound analysis of the aspects of
Comparative Law); for detail, see ERLE, DER BESTATIGUNGSVERMERK DES ABSCHULSSPROFERS (1990);
Hopt, supra note 2, at 1341-42; see also B. GROSSFELD, supra note 50, at 67; most recently, see B.
GROSSFELD, BILANZRECHT (ACCOUNTING LAW) 328 (2d ed. 1990), for further reference.
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